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Note
Federalism in Bankruptcy: Relocating the
Doctrine of Substantive Consolidation
R. Benjamin Hanna
When revelations of accounting fraud drove WorldCom into
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 2002 and 2003, it was the
largest bankruptcy the world had yet seen.1 The company’s assets exceeded $103 billion, a figure eventually surpassed only
by the bankruptcies of Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual during the 2008 financial crisis.2 Equally astounding was
the complexity of WorldCom’s corporate structure: it was comprised of over 400 legal entities, of which 222 were debtors in
the bankruptcy proceedings.3 In just a few years, millions of
transactions with an aggregate value of approximately one trillion dollars took place between the entities’ subsidiary accounts.4 Irregularities in accounting meant that even
WorldCom itself could not untangle its Gordian knot.5 Rather
than face the protracted battle of sorting out each entity’s accounts, the Creditor’s Committee opted for—and the court approved—the alternative of substantive consolidation.6 This procedure allowed WorldCom’s creditors to combine the assets of

 J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S.E.
2009, Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania. The author
wishes to thank Professor Claire Hill for her invaluable guidance on corporate
law issues. For their dedication in the editing process, the author thanks Jason Steck, Jeremy Harrell, Laura Arneson, and the hardworking editors and
staff of the Minnesota Law Review. Copyright © 2011 by R. Benjamin Hanna.
1. The Largest U.S. Bankruptcies, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 31,
2009, 10:00 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/may2009/
db20090531_413174.htm.
2. See id.
3. In re WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-13533(AJG), 2003 WL 23861928, at *7
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2003).
4. Id. at *11.
5. See id. at *10–16 (highlighting weaknesses in WorldCom’s accounting).
6. See id. at *16, *37.
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the many debtor entities and treat their liabilities as if a single
company owed them.7
Corporate bankruptcy law plays an important role in
American economic life. When a corporation is unable to pay its
debts or meet other current financial obligations, it must put
its assets under new management either by liquidation or by
rewriting its business plan and reorganizing.8 In either case,
bankruptcy promotes the efficient use of society’s scarce resources by drawing a line in the sand at which to halt ineffective uses of productive assets.9 It correspondingly safeguards
the interests of the corporation’s unsecured creditors, in part by
preventing a wasteful ―race to the courthouse‖ to collect first.10
Substantive consolidation is one of an array of mechanisms
that identify which assets in an enterprise ought to be subject
to such treatment.11 In substantive consolidation, related debtor entities merge, combining the assets and liabilities of those
entities under the auspices of a single debtor corporation.12
Within the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 105 authorizes
substantive consolidation by giving the court power to issue
any order necessary to carry out the provisions of Title 11.13
Recently, however, circuit courts have attempted to limit the
application of substantive consolidation by narrowing the factual circumstances that may allow it,14 and the Supreme Court
7. See id. at *35.
8. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–84 (2006) (detailing the liquidation
process); id. §§ 1101–74 (detailing the reorganization process). The chapters of
Title 11 contain the primary federal bankruptcy provisions.
9. Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN.
ECON. 411, 411 (1990) (―If [bankruptcy] works well, assets continue to be devoted to their most productive uses.‖).
10. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 862 (1982).
11. Substantive consolidation helps define who the debtor is; but more attention has been given to identifying what the debtor owns under the various
provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 541. See, e.g., Thomas E. Plank, The Outer Boundaries of the Bankruptcy Estate, 47 EMORY L.J. 1193, 1286–87 (1998) (arguing
that property of the estate ―should contain the interests, and only the interests, of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case‖).
12. E.g., Genesis Health Ventures, Inc. v. Stapleton (In re Genesis Health
Ventures, Inc.), 402 F.3d 416, 423 (3d Cir. 2005) (―Substantive consolidation
treats separate legal entities as if they were merged into a single survivor left
with all the cumulative assets and liabilities . . . .‖).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a); see also id. § 1123(a)(5)(C) (―Notwithstanding any
otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law, a plan shall . . . provide adequate
means for the plan’s implementation, such as . . . merger or consolidation of
the debtor with one or more persons . . . .‖).
14. E.g., In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 211 (3d Cir. 2005) (adopting
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has theoretically narrowed the authority of bankruptcy courts
to provide equitable relief to creditors.15 Separation of powers
within the federal government is the primary rationale for denying the power of federal bankruptcy courts to grant substantive consolidation, because Congress has not explicitly authorized this remedy.16 Nonetheless, courts often apply the
equitable remedy of substantive consolidation, despite the practice’s doubtful theoretical grounds.17 Its widespread applicability has important ramifications for the structures of both industrial corporations and syndicated financing arrangements.18 In
both cases, debtor-creditor and inter-creditor bargaining ―takes
place in the shadow of . . . substantive consolidation,‖ as it
would in the shadow of any relevant law.19
This Note will argue that principles of federalism should
limit the application of substantive consolidation. Part I of this
Note examines the current law of substantive consolidation in
the context of federal bankruptcy law and state corporate law.
Part II analyzes the role and constitutionality of state law in
bankruptcy remedies. Part III proposes to replace or supplement the federal doctrine of substantive consolidation with
state laws, giving greater deference to state policy decisions regarding corporate structure. This solution would lead to greater
transparency and predictability for creditors, higher shareholder value, and a long-awaited sound theoretical grounding for
the doctrine of substantive consolidation.

a more stringent test for the Third Circuit); see also Kit Weitnauer, Third Circuit Restricts Substantive Consolidation in Owens Corning, 24 AM. BANKR.
INST. J., Oct. 2005, at 26, 70 (―[P]roving a substantive consolidation case in the
Third Circuit will be difficult if not impossible.‖).
15. See J. Maxwell Tucker, Grupo Mexicano and the Death of Substantive
Consolidation, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 427, 438– 41 (2000).
16. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 51–
52 (2006).
17. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119
YALE L.J. 648, 658 (2010) (―[ W ]e have an odd world in which substantive consolidation takes place in more than half of the largest cases, even though black
letter law unequivocally states that the practice is to be imposed only in the
rarest of circumstances.‖ (footnotes omitted)).
18. William H. Widen, Corporate Form and Substantive Consolidation, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 237, 244 – 46 (2007).
19. Id. at 245. For a discussion of the impact of substantive consolidation
on structured finance, see Comm. on Bankr. & Corp. Reorg., Ass’n of the Bar
of the City of N.Y., Structured Financing Techniques, 50 BUS. LAW. 527, 558–
65 (1995).
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I. FEDERAL LAW DEFINEES BANKRUPTCY AND
SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION, WHILE STATE LAW
ESTABLISHES CORPORATIONS AND THEIR INTERESTS
This Part explores the legal framework around substantive
consolidation and state law creditors’ remedies in federal bankruptcy for corporations. First, it provides a brief overview of the
bankruptcy process and places substantive consolidation in its
statutory context. Then it assesses the role of state law provisions in corporate bankruptcy. Finally, it highlights how states
compete for corporate registrations.
A. SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION OCCUPIES A USEFUL NICHE IN
BANKRUPTCY LAW
As a general matter, bankruptcy law falls squarely within
the federal domain. The United States Constitution authorizes
Congress to ―establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.‖20 Congress relied
on this bankruptcy clause to create a comprehensive statutory
scheme regulating American bankruptcies: the Bankruptcy
Code.21 Article III, § 1 of the Constitution authorizes jurisdictional grants for courts to hear bankruptcy cases.22 Based on
this Article III authority, 28 U.S.C. § 151 establishes bankruptcy courts as units of the district courts to carry out the Bankruptcy Code.23 Section 157 further allows district courts to refer
Title 11 matters to bankruptcy judges.24
The Code establishes a complex set of rules governing the
relationships of the debtor corporation, its creditors, and their
representatives.25 When a corporation is unable to meet its financial obligations, it may file a voluntary petition for either
liquidation or reorganization with a bankruptcy court,26 or
three or more entities with claims against it may file an involuntary petition.27 This filing automatically stays any other ac20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
21. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2006).
22. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (―The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested . . . in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish.‖).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
24. Id. § 157(a).
25. For a brief overview of the typical bankruptcy proceeding, see, for example, MARK J. ROE, CORPORATE REORGANIZATION AND BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105
(2000).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 301.
27. Id. § 303.
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tions attempting to collect from the debtor.28 The bankruptcy
court may then appoint a trustee to manage the company’s
bankruptcy estate on behalf of its creditors,29 or the current
management may continue to operate the company as a debtorin-possession.30 The creditors and equity security holders organize into committees representing the various types of claims
against the debtor.31 These committees investigate the bankruptcy estate and negotiate a reorganization or liquidation
plan.32 Meanwhile, the trustee or debtor-in-possession has the
first opportunity to propose its own plan.33 If the creditor committees and debtor reach a settlement, that plan is enacted
subject to court approval.34 If not, the court, resting on its powers in equity, may ―cram down‖ a reorganization plan that it
believes is fair and equitable to each class of claims.35 The provisions of such a plan may include the rejection of executory
contracts, settlement of the debtor or estate’s legal claims, sale
of assets, redistribution of interests in the corporation, and any
other ―appropriate‖ provision.36 Upon confirmation, the plan
becomes binding on the debtor,37 and the court has authority to
issue orders to implement it.38
During the pendency of a bankruptcy, the trustee or debtor-in-possession may pursue legal claims that seek to enlarge
the bankruptcy estate by pulling in property that ought to be
subject to the creditors’ claims.39 These claims include the
kinds of suits ordinarily brought by corporations, such as ac28. Id. § 362.
29. Id. § 1104 (allowing the appointment of a trustee); id. § 1106 (describing the duties of a trustee).
30. Id. § 1107(a) (―[A] debtor in possession shall have all the
rights . . . and shall perform all the functions and duties . . . of a trustee . . . .‖).
31. See id. § 1102.
32. Id. § 1103(c).
33. See id. § 1121( b).
34. See id. § 1128 (requiring the court to hold a confirmation hearing for
the plan); id. § 1129(a) ( listing the requirements of a confirmed plan).
35. See id. § 1129( b). In order to ―cram down‖ a plan, the court must find
that all of the requirements listed in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) are met, except 11
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8), requiring each class to have accepted the plan, or at least
not be impaired by it. Id. § 1129( b).
36. Id. § 1123( b).
37. Id. § 1141(a).
38. Id. § 1142.
39. See, e.g., Christopher Fong, Creditors and Rule 9019(A): Casting
Doubt on the Trustee’s Sole Authority to Settle Claims of the Estate, 82 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 591, 610 (2008) (observing that ―causes of action held by the debtor have been considered property of the estate‖ (footnote omitted)).
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tions for breach of contract or fiduciary duty.40 Additionally,
there are a number of actions or procedural options which are
either specific to bankruptcy law or have special salience in this
context. One such option is the motion for turnover of property,
which gives the estate broad powers to collect from its debtors.41 For example, property seized by secured creditors prior
to the commencement of the bankruptcy may be reclaimed by
the estate.42
The trustee has additional tools for collection when the
debtors and creditors are related parties. Fraudulent conveyance or fraudulent transfer rules permit creditors to void
recent transfers of property made for insufficient consideration,
if such transfer was made with intent to ―hinder, delay, or defraud‖ any creditor.43 Bankruptcy courts may subordinate to
other creditors, or even refuse to recognize, the claims of shareholders on loans they made to the corporation.44
State law also supplies actions that allow recovery to related parties by varying the attributes of corporate form.45 Alter ego or instrumentality rules make an owner’s or parent
company’s assets available to creditors of the subsidiary where
the parent has used the subsidiary as an extension of itself—
where an identity between them is established.46 The closely
related state law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil allows
recovery from controlling shareholders where they have not
respected the corporate form.47 Reverse piercing of the corporate veil—suit by or through an owner to reach assets of its
40. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1), in conjunction with § 704(a)(1), trustees
have a duty to collect the property of the estate, which is defined by § 541(a).
Such property includes any ―causes of action belonging to the debtor at the
time the case is commenced.‖ La. World Exposition v. Fed. Ins. Co., 858 F.2d
233, 245 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Smith v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 421 F.3d 989,
1002 (9th Cir. 2005) (―The property of the estate includes all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property . . . including the debtor’s causes of action.‖
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
41. See 11 U.S.C. § 542.
42. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 202–04 (1983).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A); see also id. § 544.
44. See Robert W. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979,
1001–02 (1971).
45. This occurs most notably by suspending the corporate attribute of limited liability. E.g., Daniel R. Kahan, Shareholder Liability for Corporate
Torts: A Historical Perspective, 97 GEO. L.J. 1085, 1095–96 (2009).
46. E.g., Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940) (enumerating ten
circumstances determinative of instrumentality).
47. See, e.g., DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co.,
540 F.2d 681, 686–87 (4th Cir. 1976).

2011]

FEDERALISM IN BANKRUPTCY

717

corporation—is available in many states, although a consistent
theory has not yet emerged.48 New York has gone beyond reverse piercing by creating a horizontal piercing standard based
on agency law for reaching the assets of related corporations
that do not stand in a parent-subsidiary relationship.49 California is a leader in enterprise liability, which resembles alter ego
theory but does not require a showing of fraud,50 whereas Texas courts made an early start but withdrew the state’s doctrine
as contrary to legislative intent.51 Where one entity is an agent
of another, or where multiple entities work together as a partnership, actions grounded in agency law may also have the effect of exposing related entities to each other’s liabilities.52
There is variation between states with respect to these intracorporate actions. This variation is borne out by which liability
standards are recognized, how they are articulated, and, most
importantly, how they are applied.53
Substantive consolidation provides yet another theory for
trustees seeking a broader asset base in a federal bankruptcy
proceeding. A bankruptcy court may combine related entities if
doing so would avoid inequity in distributions among creditors.54 Short of actually combining entities, the court may also
distribute the assets of all related entities as if such a combina48. Elham Youabian, Reverse Piercing of the Corporate Veil: The Implications of Bypassing “Ownership” Interest, 33 SW. U. L. REV. 573, 577 (2004).
49. See, e.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 7–8 (N.Y. 1966) (discussing the applicability of piercing the corporate veil when ―a corporation is a
fragment of a larger corporate combine which actually conducts the business‖).
50. See J. Maxwell Tucker, Substantive Consolidation: The Cacophony
Continues©, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 89, 161–62 (2010). Rather than proof
of fraud, courts instead rely on analogies to partnership principles of liability.
See id.
51. SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444, 456
(Tex. 2008) (―The single business enterprise liability theory is fundamentally
inconsistent with the approach taken by the Legislature.‖); see also Tucker,
supra note 50, at 161 n.311 ( listing Texas Courts of Appeal that had approved
the theory before the Texas Supreme Court later rejected it).
52. See 11 U.S.C. § 723(a) (2006) (calling for the application of nonbankruptcy law against partners of the debtor); Hamilton, supra note 44, at 983–
84 (discussing agency law in a context similar to veil-piercing).
53. See John H. Matheson, The Modern Law of Corporate Groups: An Empirical Study of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the Parent-Subsidiary Context,
87 N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1117–20 (2009) (illustrating state differences in piercing
decisions and noting that California and Florida had the greatest percentage
of piercing decisions, while Pennsylvania had the least).
54. See, e.g., Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Corp. (In re Auto-Train Corp.), 810
F.2d 270, 276–77 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that facilitating equality of distribution among creditors is a primary policy of the Bankruptcy Code).
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tion had occurred (―deemed consolidation‖).55 Two distinct
strains of the substantive-consolidation doctrine have arisen.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
grants substantive consolidation if substantial identity exists
between the entities and consolidation is necessary to avoid
harm or realize a benefit that outweighs the harm from consolidation.56 However, if a creditor objects because it relied on the
entities’ separateness in extending credit, consolidation may
occur only if the benefit greatly outweighs the harm.57 In contrast, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals allows consolidation
when either of two factors is satisfied: (1) creditors did not rely
on the separateness of the entities; or (2) the ―affairs of the debtor are so entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors.‖58 Other circuits use some hybrid of these inquiries.59 For
example, the Third Circuit will consolidate related entities if
creditors relied on the debtor’s own disregard for the separateness of entities, or if the debtor’s accounts are ―so scrambled
that separating them is prohibitive . . . .‖60
Courts often cite substantive consolidation as a rare or limited remedy,61 but in practice it is used frequently, particularly in the bankruptcies of large, complex firms.62 This is presumably because the practice is a very useful one.
Consolidation overcomes the need to determine ownership of
assets as between a parent corporation and its subsidiaries,
which can require a great expenditure of time and resources for
forensic accounting and protracted litigation.63 Procedural consolidation of related-entity bankruptcies necessarily follows
from substantive consolidation; therefore, some further savings
may accrue from consolidation if the cases were not yet under

55. E.g., In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 202 (3d Cir. 2005).
56. In re Auto-Train, 810 F.2d at 276.
57. Id.
58. Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo
Baking Co.), 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988).
59. E.g., In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 211.
60. Id.
61. E.g., In re Bonham, 229 F.3d 750, 767 (9th Cir. 2000).
62. Widen, supra note 18, at 252–55 (―[O]ver fifty percent of large corporate reorganizations use substantive consolidation . . . .‖).
63. See In re WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-13533(AJG), 2003 WL 23861928, at
*16 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2003) (noting the prohibitive cost of litigating
intercompany claims); Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 17 (citing In re
WorldCom, which involved nearly a trillion dollars in transfers between corporations with accompanying financial statements).
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joint administration.64 Consolidation, both procedural and
substantive, is entrenched in federal bankruptcy law. Nevertheless, there are some ways that state law can impact the outcome of corporate bankruptcy and substantive consolidation.
B. STATES PLAY A CRITICAL ROLE IN SHAPING THE BANKRUPTCY
PROCESS
States lack the authority to explicitly regulate bankruptcy
by dividing a debtor’s property among its creditors because the
Constitution places that remedy under the purview of Congress.65 The Supreme Court has held that Congress’s desire for
national uniformity in enacting the Bankruptcy Code necessarily excludes state regulation, to avoid inconsistencies and
confusion with state law.66 Thus, ―[s]tates may not pass or enforce laws to interfere with or complement the Bankruptcy Act
or to provide additional or auxiliary regulations.‖67 Nevertheless, state law can influence bankruptcy in at least three important ways.
1. Definition of Property and Claims
In Butner v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court opened
the door to limited indirect state regulation over bankruptcy
through the definition of property and security rights.68 Section
541 of the Bankruptcy Code identifies the property of the estate, and therefore incorporates state property law into the
Code.69 The rule in Butner upholds the application of such state
laws in federal bankruptcy court to the extent that they do not
conflict with the laws of Congress, and no federal interest requires a different result.70 Butner and its progeny give states a

64. See J. Stephen Gilbert, Note, Substantive Consolidation in Bankruptcy: A Primer, 43 VAND. L. REV. 207, 212–13 (1990) (comparing substantive consolidation with joint administration).
65. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress power to make
laws on the subject of bankruptcies); id. art. VI, cl. 2 (holding laws of the United States supreme over state laws); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 122, 126–27, 129 (1819).
66. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929).
67. Id.
68. 440 U.S. 48, 54 –55 (1979) (―Congress has generally left the determination of property rights . . . to state law.‖).
69. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006).
70. Butner, 440 U.S. at 54 n.9, 55.
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limited gap-filling power to define claims and defenses.71 The
Fifth Circuit pushes this logic further by presuming the validity of the application of state law.72 It contends that ―[c]reditors’
entitlements in bankruptcy arise in the first instance from the
underlying substantive law creating the debtor’s obligation,
subject to any qualifying or contrary provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.‖73 However, courts often distinguish Butner as inapplicable for particular kinds of claims. For example, in In re
Kenneth Allen Knight Trust, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit drew a distinction between substantive property rights
defined by state law and questions of procedure which state law
does not control.74
2. Corporate Structure
Regardless of operational structure, a business often exists
formally as a collection of entities in parent-subsidiary and
partnership relationships, rather than as a unitary corporation.75 One function of this subdivision is to identify the assets
belonging within a business unit of the firm.76 Where a business’s subdivision corresponds to its operations, it can serve as
a basis for internal managerial accountability.77 Otherwise, it
may simply reduce transaction costs associated with the acquisition or sale of groups of assets.78 Another, more substantive
function of subdivision is asset partitioning79: if state law so
provides, the use of multiple entities can shield one entity from
the debts of the others.80 Two corporate features, artificial per71. See, e.g., Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549
U.S. 443, 444 (2007); In re Bryant Manor, LLC, 422 B.R. 278, 287–88 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 2010) (citing Butner, 440 U.S. at 54 –55).
72. In re Miller, 570 F.3d 633, 640 (5th Cir. 2009).
73. Id. (citation omitted).
74. See 303 F.3d 671, 678–79 (6th Cir. 2002) (―[W]hether an entity is eligible for relief under title 11 . . . is purely a matter of federal law.‖).
75. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 17, at 657–58 (noting that large
businesses often comprise a corporate group with distinct subsidiaries).
76. See Widen, supra note 18, at 260–61 (―[T]he corporation allows for
easy identification of a group of assets under a single name.‖).
77. WorldCom failed to take advantage of this opportunity. See In re
WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-13533(AJG), 2003 WL 23861928, at *10 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2003) (recognizing WorldCom had far more company account
codes than legal entities).
78. See Widen, supra note 18, at 260–61.
79. Id. at 260.
80. See, e.g., Marcus Cole, Limiting Liability Through Bankruptcy, 70 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1245, 1255–56 (2002) (defining asset partitioning as ―the designa-
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sonality and limited liability, produce this effect.81 Artificial
personality identifies a debt as owed by the specific entity rather than the business as a whole.82 Limited liability prevents
the parent from being held liable for the subsidiary’s debt
beyond the extent of its investment (affirmative asset partitioning) or the subsidiary from being held liable for the parent’s
debt, except to the extent that some of the subsidiary’s shares
may be seized by the creditor.83 In bankruptcy, the result of
this noninterference between parent and subsidiary assets is
that ―creditors of the parent company may recover from the assets of the subsidiary company only after the subsidiary has
paid all of its obligations.‖84 This is referred to as ―structural
subordination‖ or ―structural seniority,‖ and it typically applies
even with respect to senior secured lenders of the parent.85
States modify the results of structural subordination
through causes of action related to the operation and management of related entities, such as piercing the corporate veil, alter ego, enterprise liability, and reverse piercing of the corporate veil.86 Some of these state law claims remain valid through
the bankruptcy process because they are held by related debtor
entities and regarded as property inhering in the claimants—
now the bankruptcy estate.87 However, outsiders seeking to assert claims against debtor entities are relegated to unsecured
creditor status, if the claim is allowed at all.88 Even so, any

tion of a separate pool of assets that are available to satisfy claims by a firm’s
creditors, distinct from the personal assets of the firm’s owners and managers‖).
81. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636
(1819) (―Being the mere creature of law, [a corporation] possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it . . . . Among the
most important are immortality, and . . . individuality . . . .‖).
82. Cf. Widen, supra note 18, at 261 (―[A]ssets in the subsidiary remain
governed by the name of the subsidiary.‖).
83. See Cole, supra note 80, at 1255–59.
84. Tucker, supra note 50, at 90.
85. Id. at 90 n.3.
86. Application of these liability theories moots structural subordination
by permitting otherwise junior creditors to share pari passu with existing
creditors. See id. at 160 n.307 (discussing the effect of reverse veil-piercing on
structural subordination).
87. See, e.g., Smith v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 421 F.3d 989, 1002 (9th Cir.
2005) (―The property of the estate includes all legal or equitable interests of
the debtor in property . . . including the debtor’s causes of action.‖ (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
88. See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2006).
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claims allowed have the effect of diluting the interests of other
unsecured creditors, varying the outcome of the bankruptcy.89
3. Bankruptcy by Contract
Notwithstanding the variety of claims that may be mustered amongst debtor entities and against them by outside
creditors, debtors and creditors may attempt to predetermine
the outcome of credit events by contract.90 Similarly, businesses
can contract away their entity distinctions by granting indemnification to creditors of a subsidiary entity, or among the debtor entities. Enforceability is the critical caveat to this principle. State law provides the first hurdle: ordinary state law
contract defenses still apply.91 Enforceability at the federal level is a greater challenge, because creditors in bankruptcy hold
only generic claims bereft of bargained-for contractual protections.92 Academics and judges are split over whether, which,
and to what extent contracts regarding substantive or procedural rights in bankruptcy should be enforced.93 Bankruptcy
courts have considerable discretion within their equitable powers to allow or disallow the contractual claim, or approve or
disapprove of a reorganization plan that purports to settle the
claim.94 Depending upon the leeway granted by bankruptcy
judges, contract claims can be the most important way that
state law influences federal bankruptcy results.
89. Cf. Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J.
131, 134 (1989) (defining ―claim dilution‖ in the more typical context of new
debt issuance).
90. See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, in CORPORATE
BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 190, 190 (Jagdeep S.
Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss eds., 1996) (―[T]he actual bargain among investors is not silent on how to allocate insolvency risk.‖).
91. See Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S.
443, 450 (2007) (citing the settled principle that ―requires bankruptcy courts to
consult state law in determining the validity of most claims‖).
92. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 17, at 663–64.
93. See Susan Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy,
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 503, 512–18 (comparing arguments for and against contract bankruptcy proposals); Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy:
Judicial Competence and Statutory Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 572–73
(2001) (noting a difference in judges’ attitudes toward ex-ante bankruptcy contracts); John McConnell & Henri Servaes, The Economics of Pre-Packaged
Bankruptcy, in CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 90, at 322, 322 (highlighting the benefits of pre-packaged
bankruptcies); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor ’s Choice: A Menu Approach to
Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 100–21 (1992) (arguing for a menu
of contract options to replace mandatory Chapter 11 reorganization).
94. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129( b) (2006).
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C. STATES COMPETE AS CORPORATE DOMICILES AND
REGULATORS
Corporations are creatures of state law.95 Their charters
are issued by states, and amount to contracts between states
and corporations.96 Regardless of where business activities will
take place, organizers can choose to incorporate in any of the
fifty states,97 although in practice incorporators typically
choose either Delaware or the state where the corporation is
headquartered.98 Assuming rational value-maximizing behavior, corporate organizers will choose to incorporate in the state
that best meets their needs, considering factors such as convenience, shareholder and related-corporation liability, antitakeover statutes,99 blue sky laws, taxation,100 franchise fees, structural flexibility, director and officer liability, judicial quality,
the adoption of the Model Business Corporations Act,101 and
contract enforcement. These factors can affect shareholder
wealth directly through relative costs and benefits to the corporation, and also indirectly through their impact on the cost of
capital.
There is considerable debate over whether state competition along these lines has been good or bad for shareholder value, states, and society—for example, whether it constitutes a
―race to the top‖ or ―race to the bottom.‖102 The potential for incorporation or reincorporation in another state confers agency
costs on the choice of state because management may seek
states with laws more favorable to its job security than to
95. See, e.g., Peter V. Letsou, The Changing Face of Corporate Governance
Regulation in the United States: The Evolving Roles of the Federal and State
Governments, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 149, 150 (2009).
96. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 592
(1819).
97. See, e.g., Letsou, supra note 95.
98. See Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on
Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1813–19 (2002) (comparing the distributions of corporate headquarters and incorporations by state).
99. See id. at 1827, 1852 (finding that managers migrate to states with
typical antitakeover statutes).
100. But cf. Jens Dammann, A New Approach to Corporate Choice of Law,
38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 51, 71 (2005) (arguing that corporate taxation is
unlikely to be relevant to reincorporation decisions).
101. Marcel Kahan, The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility,
Judicial Quality, or Takeover Protection?, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 340, 341– 47
(2006).
102. E.g., Subramanian, supra note 98, at 1797–98.
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shareholder value.103 Nevertheless, there are some good reasons to think that allowing states discretion in governing corporate affairs is a generally positive thing. First, the agency
costs of reincorporation are partially mitigated by the common
requirement of shareholder approval.104 Second, this federalist
arrangement gives states latitude to experiment, as the socalled laboratories of democracy.105 The penalty of declining
charter revenues gives states incentive to improve their policies
to meet changing economic conditions.106 States have the ability to be more agile than the federal government in doing so,
and the result of a mistake impacts only one state rather than
the whole nation.107 When one state does achieve a workable
solution to a perceived problem, a majority of the remaining
states follow suit.108
Unsurprisingly then, every state recognizes some form of
veil-piercing theory, and many allow additional actions.109 Although states may not directly regulate bankruptcy, these entity-disregarding claims are often valid in bankruptcy, but do not
operate to the extent of substantive consolidation of debtors.
Part II of this Note will assert that states may extend their
creditor remedies to the point of allowing substantive consolidation of debtors.

103. Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1559, 1569 (2002).
104. See Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 849 (1993) (touting the
shareholder vote requirement for reincorporation). But see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1471 (1992) (arguing that
shareholders might approve reincorporation, even if the move would decrease
shareholder value).
105. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (encouraging ―experimentation in the fields of social and
economic science‖ among the states).
106. See Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation
and State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 213
(2006) (explaining how Delaware’s reliance on incorporations for state revenues ensures the responsiveness of its corporate law).
107. Cf. id. at 235–36 (noting that national policies are likely to replicate
only an average state’s regime, at best).
108. Id. at 216.
109. See Matheson, supra note 53, at 1119–20 ( presenting veil-piercing data for all fifty states).
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II. THERE IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY SCOPE
FOR STATES TO INFLUENCE SUBSTANTIVE
CONSOLIDATION
Exercising their traditional authority in matters relating to
corporate law, states may intervene in corporate bankruptcies
to alter the outcomes related to substantive consolidation of
debtor entities by establishing property interests and causes of
action that demarcate the boundaries of corporate form. This
Part asserts that federal substantive consolidation doctrine adversely impacts states’ ability to define their own corporate law.
This Part demonstrates that state actions for substantive consolidation are permissible under the U.S. Constitution and
Bankruptcy Code with respect to both direct limits on state
bankruptcy laws and bankruptcy court jurisdictional defects.
Part III will then contend that states should adopt such substantive consolidation policies.
A. SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION DIMINISHES THE ROLE OF
STATES AND BUSINESSES IN DEFINING CORPORATE BOUNDARIES
In the absence of substantive consolidation, states have
significant discretion in defining the property rights and corresponding liability standards that will carry through to bankruptcy.110 States can adopt standards that respect or disregard
business entities to the extent they deem appropriate, though
this power is muted by the equitable powers of bankruptcy
courts, for example, through equitable subordination of interests.111 To the extent state laws differ, businesses may select
which legal standards will apply to them by exercising their
ability to choose their state of incorporation.112
The federal bankruptcy doctrine of substantive consolidation arrests states’ capacity to define the boundaries of corporate form by mandating an enterprise theory of related-entity
110. Cf. G. Marcus Cole, The Federalist Cost of Bankruptcy Exemption
Reform, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227, 240 (2000) (―[W]hatever law governed rights
outside of bankruptcy must also govern those rights inside.‖).
111. Equitable subordination allows courts to make exceptions to priority
rules when justified by the facts. See United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535,
539– 40 (1996).
112. Where it applies, the internal affairs doctrine makes an organizer’s
choice of where to incorporate meaningful by applying the law of the state of
incorporation to disputes among or between the corporation and its current
officers, directors, or shareholders, even if the action is brought in another jurisdiction. E.g., Hollis v. Hill, 232 F.3d 460, 464 –65 (5th Cir. 2000); see also
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982).
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liability regardless of state law.113 Substantive consolidation
rearranges the priority of claims by rendering structural subordination inapposite.114 Subsidiary entities merge into the
parent, or all of them into a new entity, so that there is no
longer any distinction of which groups of assets are subject to
which claims.115 This override of structural subordination
forces creditors of one debtor to share pari passu with creditors
of a less solvent debtor.116 Merger doctrine extinguishes any intra-company claims.117 The rhetorical (albeit not actual) reluctance of courts to grant substantive consolidation rests substantially on the fact of the doctrine’s significant impact on
creditors’ rights.118 Indeed, substantive consolidation is most
likely at precisely the point it has the greatest impact: in the
case of large, sophisticated companies that have ordered their
affairs in reliance on the legal distinctness of subsidiary entities under state corporate law.119
There are both costs and benefits to this federal override of
claim priority. Substantive consolidation undoubtedly frustrates the reasonable state-law-based expectations of some parties, though in many cases consolidation is an element of a reorganization plan agreed on by the creditors’ committees.120 In
an extremely complex case, like WorldCom, the application of
substantive consolidation seems unobjectionable because some
of the justifications for strict separation of entities were unmet.
Asset partitioning (dividing a business’s assets among multiple
entities) may have reduced the cost of creditor monitoring,121
but these savings were offset by the cost of moral hazard as

113. See Tucker, supra note 50, at 187 (describing substantive consolidation as a ―federalization of state corporate law‖ in favor of enterprise theory).
114. Id. at 163.
115. See In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1988).
116. Id. at 518.
117. See id. at 519.
118. See id. at 518 (―[S]ubstantive consolidation is no mere instrument of
procedural convenience . . . but a measure vitally affecting substantive
rights, . . . to be used sparingly.‖ (quoting Flora Mir Candy Corp. v. R.S. Dickson & Co., 432 F.2d 1060, 1062 (2d Cir. 1970))).
119. Cf. William H. Widen, Prevalence of Substantive Consolidation in
Large Bankruptcies from 2000 to 2004: Preliminary Results, 14 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 47, 53–54 (2006) (reviewing statistics showing higher incidence
of substantive consolidation as corporate asset value increases).
120. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 17 (noting the process by which
judges often approve such plans).
121. See Cole, supra note 80, at 1256–57.
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structural complexity allowed for the concealment of fraud.122
Rather than enhance internal controls, the subdivision of the
business into subsidiary entities generated related-party transactions which the accountants were unable to reconcile.123 The
principal benefit of substantive consolidation in such cases is
that it regards the corporation as the corporation regarded itself, and avoids the impracticable task of properly identifying
assets with entities.124
The primary cost of federal substantive consolidation
comes in the form of uncertainty for creditors, which translates
into higher borrowing costs for debtors. As the Second Circuit
recognized in In re Augie/Restivo, ―lenders’ expectations are
central to the calculation of interest rates and other terms of
loans, and fulfilling those expectations is therefore important to
the efficiency of credit markets. Such efficiency will be undermined by imposing substantive consolidation in circumstances
in which creditors believed they were dealing with separate
entities.‖125 Uncertain outcomes increase the cost of capital for
businesses, decreasing shareholder value. If creditors are unsure which law will apply in bankruptcy, substantive consolidation or state corporate law, and are unable to contract around
it, they will demand higher interest rates in compensation for
bearing that risk.126 The Augie/Restivo court sought to mitigate
the uncertainty created by substantive consolidation by applying the doctrine only when justified by the course of dealing
and expectations.127 Given the difficulty of accurately assessing
expectations ex post, having a clear, definitive, black-letter law
of substantive consolidation, or no law at all, would be more
helpful in avoiding the cost of uncertainty.
B. THE BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE AND BANKRUPTCY CODE DO NOT
PREEMPT STATE SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION LAWS.
Preemption is a plausible objection to state laws implementing substantive consolidation. According to the preemp122. See Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 1333, 1401–02 (2006); Ken Belson & Seth Schiesel, Did the Buck Stop
Anywhere?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2005, at C1.
123. In re WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-13533(AJG), 2003 WL 23861928, at *12–
13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2003).
124. Id. at *16.
125. In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1988).
126. Cf. id. (noting the importance of lender expectations for interest
rates).
127. Id.
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tion argument, Congress alone has specific authority under the
Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution to establish uniform
laws for bankruptcy.128 In enacting the Bankruptcy Code, Congress showed clear intent to occupy the entire field, preempting
any state bankruptcy laws that might be passed.129 A state substantive consolidation law would be a state bankruptcy law, and
therefore would be unconstitutional due to federal preemption.
A state substantive consolidation law must be rejected if it
purports to establish a system for the discharge of insolvent
debtors.130 This prohibition is implied from the Bankruptcy
Clause itself, even in the absence of a federal bankruptcy
code.131 However, a state law of substantive consolidation need
not go to this length to be effective. Where Congress has acted
by creating a federal bankruptcy code, Butner v. United States
provides the formula for determining whether a state law has
been preempted where the ―constitutional authority of Congress . . . would . . . encompass a federal statute defining‖ the
disputed interest.132 Inclusion of the property interest within
the constitutional limits of Congress’s bankruptcy power is the
threshold inquiry for Butner analysis.133 The Bankruptcy
Clause would clearly authorize Congress to enact a substantive
consolidation rule; however, Congress has failed to do so. Thus,
a state substantive consolidation law is not necessarily
preempted, and Butner analysis should apply.
A state law does not need to define an interest in property
per se to invoke Butner.134 State law granting a private cause of
action would create a substantive property interest in the claim
sufficient to raise Butner analysis.135 For example, giving senior creditors of a parent corporation the right to force a merger
between parent and subsidiary would therefore be sufficient to
128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (giving Congress the power ―[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States‖).
129. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929) (―States may not
pass or enforce laws to interfere with or complement the Bankruptcy Act or to
provide additional or auxiliary regulations.‖).
130. See id. at 266; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 126–
27, 129 (1819).
131. Sturges, 17 U.S. at 126–27.
132. 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 55 (―The justifications for application of state law are not limited
to ownership interests . . . .‖).
135. Yaquinto v. Segerstrom (In re Segerstrom), 247 F.3d 218, 224 (5th Cir.
2001).
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invoke Butner. Kenneth Allen Knight Trust distinguished between substantive state laws and procedural laws that determine access to federal bankruptcy courts and eligibility for relief. Substantive laws would be subject to Butner analysis while
procedural laws would be evaluated under federal law.136 A
state substantive consolidation law would not fall into the proscribed procedural category because it has no bearing on
whether a claimant under the law would have standing to file a
bankruptcy case.137 Properly drafted, it would merely state an
interest to be vindicated, either in state or bankruptcy court.
Therefore Butner analysis applies.
Under Butner, state laws are ―suspended only to the extent
of actual conflict with the . . . Bankruptcy Act.‖138 Furthermore,
state law property interests should not be ―analyzed differently‖ due to the bankruptcy context, ―[u]nless some federal interest requires a different result‖ than that provided by state
law.139 State substantive consolidation laws would meet this
test. They would not be in actual conflict with the Bankruptcy
Act because there is little explicit statutory support for federal
substantive consolidation. The doctrine’s one-line mention in 11
U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(C) is part of a list of examples of how a
court might implement a reorganization plan.140 Most, if not
all, of the items listed in this statute relate to other things governed primarily or exclusively by state law, even within the
bankruptcy context.141 Statutory analysis suggests that Congress intended to let state law apply.
No federal interest requires a different result from that
provided under state law. When a property interest is at stake,
the federal interest in uniformity does not act as a bar to state
laws.142 It is simply expected that property interests will differ
by state.143 The federal interest in national uniformity is not
compelling here because Congress failed to provide any mech136. Brady-Morris v. Schilling (In re Kenneth Allen Knight Trust), 303
F.3d 671, 678–79 (6th Cir. 2002).
137. Cf. id. (holding that the character of a business trust was properly addressed by federal law because the question pertained to whether the trust
had standing to file a bankruptcy case).
138. Butner, 440 U.S. at 54 n.9.
139. Id. at 55.
140. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(C) (2006).
141. See id. § 1123(a)(5).
142. Cf. Butner, 440 U.S. at 55–56 (rejecting uniformity as mandating a
federal rule for mortgagee security interests).
143. See id. at 53.
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anism to ensure uniformity in application among federal
courts.144 Instead, substantive consolidation is relegated to the
general equitable administration of the court’s business.145
Thus, federal interests in equitable and efficient administration
of the bankruptcy laws support allowing the states to define
substantive consolidation.
While state substantive consolidation laws could lead to
bankruptcy outcomes that vary state to state (horizontal nonuniformity), they would have the advantage of making results
consistent between state and federal courts within the same
state (vertical uniformity). The Butner and International Shoe
courts recognized an interest in ―[u]niform treatment of property interests by both state and federal courts within a State.‖146
The courts fear that non-uniformity within a state would promote uncertainty and confusion of legal standards, forum shopping, offer a choice of between relief under the Bankruptcy Act
or state insolvency laws, and potentially give one party a windfall merely due to the debtor’s bankruptcy.147 Yet, the current
state of substantive consolidation law has these very effects.148
State law creditors’ remedies and inter-corporate liability theories do not go as far as substantive consolidation in putting all
of the bankrupt enterprise’s assets into one pot.149 This difference means that as much as a billion dollars of recovery can
ride on the distinction between litigating in state court and
consolidating in bankruptcy court.150 State substantive consolidation rules could prevent this non-uniform application of state
law by providing a single rule of decision for both state courts
and bankruptcy courts sitting in the state.
State substantive consolidation laws would not offend the
Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution and would not be
preempted by the Bankruptcy Code. They are a logical extension of the more expansive enterprise theory causes of action,
which are allowed under the Code so long as they are valid un144. See, e.g., id. at 54.
145. E.g., In re Bonham, 226 B.R. 56, 75 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1998).
146. Butner, 440 U.S. at 55; see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261,
265 (1929).
147. See Butner, 440 U.S. at 55; Int’l Shoe Co., 278 U.S. at 265.
148. Cf. Levitin, supra note 16, at 16 (―Allowing courts . . . to go farther
afield than the statutory language undercuts the point of codification.‖).
149. Cf. Tucker, supra note 15, at 427 (describing substantive consolidation
as an ―extraordinary remedy‖ that ―may have the effect of overriding the bedrock principle of limited liability‖).
150. See, e.g., Widen, supra note 18, at 243.
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der state law.151 Allowing those claims in bankruptcy is little
different from allowing substantive consolidation. However,
simply avoiding preemption is not sufficient to bring an action
to court. The bankruptcy court must also have jurisdiction to
hear the claim.
C. BANKRUPTCY COURTS MAY LACK AUTHORITY TO ORDER
SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION YET HAVE JURISDICTION TO
DECIDE A STATE ACTION FOR SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION
Substantive consolidation is a popular remedy today, but
its time may be coming to an end. Some scholars argue that
bankruptcy courts lack authority to implement substantive
consolidation because it was unavailable in English Chancery
Courts when the Constitution was drafted.152 If this argument
gained traction in the courts, it could threaten the basis of federal substantive consolidation doctrine, but open the door for
state causes of action.
1. Federal Courts Lack Authority to Grant Substantive
Consolidation as a Federal Equitable Remedy
Although the doctrine of substantive consolidation in federal bankruptcy law arguably has ancient antecedents at equity,153 its explicit application in American bankruptcy courts is a
relatively recent phenomenon. The Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine, albeit not yet by name, in its 1941 Sampsell
v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp. decision.154 The Court upheld
the absorption of corporate assets into the debtor’s estate of the
controlling individual shareholder, which resembled a reverse
piercing of the corporate veil.155 Sampsell reached its conclusion by analogy to state law theories of fraudulent conveyance,
alter ego, and piercing the corporate veil.156
Two sections of the Bankruptcy Code are typically cited as
the statutory basis for a bankruptcy court’s authority to grant a
request for substantive consolidation. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) gives
151. See Tucker, supra note 15, at 161–62.
152. E.g., id. at 437– 45.
153. See, e.g., Widen, supra note 18, at 317–23. Contra Tucker, supra note
50, at 111–14.
154. 313 U.S. 215 (1941).
155. Id. For an informative summary and discussion of the case, see Seth
D. Amera & Alan Kolod, Substantive Consolidation: Getting Back to Basics, 14
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 3–9 (2006).
156. See Sampsell, 313 U.S. at 217, 219–21.
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courts the power to ―issue any order . . . that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the Bankruptcy
Code].‖157 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(C), declares that Chapter 11
reorganization plans shall ―provide adequate means
for . . . implementation, such as . . . merger or consolidation of
the debtor with one or more persons . . . .‖158 Read together,
§ 105(a) and § 1123(a) may allow a court to consolidate entities
pursuant to the reorganization plan it approves.159 Section
105(a) grants bankruptcy courts sweeping equitable powers to
enforce the Code, although there is substantial debate over how
to define its outer limits.160 One theoretically clear limit on
courts’ use of § 105(a) is that a court may only issue orders that
fall within its grant of jurisdiction.161 It is less clear in marginal
cases whether both Congress and the Constitution have
granted jurisdiction that covers a particular order.
The import of this jurisdictional issue is that bankruptcy
courts arguably lack power to issue orders granting substantive
consolidation. The jurisdiction exercised by bankruptcy courts
stems from § 105 of the Code,162 which in turn refers to Title
28, where 28 U.S.C. § 151 establishes bankruptcy courts as a
division of the district courts.163 The district courts exercise
subject matter jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act of 1789,164
which is limited by the constitutional heads of jurisdiction:
―The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under . . . the Laws of the United States . . . .‖165
Based on this constitutional limitation, the Supreme Court held
in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund,
157. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006).
158. Id. § 1123(a)(5)(C).
159. Provisions of these statutes must reinforce each other to obtain this
result, however. See Douglas G. Baird, Substantive Consolidation Today, 47
B.C. L. REV. 5, 19 (2005) (admitting that § 1123(a) ―provides a thin reed for
justifying substantive consolidation‖); id. (―Courts have stated again and again
that substantive powers cannot be derived from Section 105 . . . .‖).
160. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 50, at 114 –27 (discussing a variety of arguments and recent case law regarding 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)); Chelsey W. Tulis,
Get Real: Reframing the Debate over How to Calculate Projected Disposable
Income in § 1325( b), 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 345, 387–89 (2009) (arguing that
§ 105 allows courts to ―consider the purpose and policy implications of the
Code‖).
161. See Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 307–08 (1995).
162. See 11 U.S.C. § 105.
163. See 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
164. See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78–79.
165. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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Inc. that federal courts sitting in equity may only grant relief
―traditionally accorded by courts of equity.‖166 Thus bankruptcy
courts exercising equitable powers are subject to the restrictions imposed by Grupo Mexicano: they have only the powers
exercised by the Chancery Courts in England in 1789.167
The jurisdictional basis for substantive consolidation has
come under fire from academia over the past decade based on
Grupo Mexicano,168 though courts have generally continued
with bankruptcy as usual.169 Some scholars argue that substantive consolidation is a newer equitable remedy provided by
a bankruptcy court sitting in equity under the auspices of the
Judiciary Act, and therefore bankruptcy courts lack jurisdiction
under Grupo Mexicano to impose consolidation.170 Alternatively, bankruptcy courts approving substantive consolidation
could be regarded as doing so pursuant to a federal common
law rule.171 Then analogy to the Erie doctrine would suggest
that bankruptcy courts lack authority to create a federal common law of substantive consolidation.172 Courts have not yet affirmatively decided these issues, leaving substantive consolidation doctrine in a ―peculiar nether-world‖ of uncertain
legitimacy in the eyes of legal scholars.173 There is a risk that
courts may eventually be persuaded they do not have jurisdiction over substantive consolidation.
2. Bankruptcy Courts May Nevertheless Order Substantive
Consolidation Premised on State Causes of Action
The Constitutional limit on the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy
court imposed by Grupo Mexicano would not be breached by
hearing a case for the application of state substantive consolidation law, because it would take the form of an adjudication of
a claim against the estate or a property interest owned by it. If
166. 527 U.S. 308, 319 (1999).
167. Id. at 318.
168. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 15, at 437– 45.
169. For a summary of judicial reactions to Grupo Mexicano in the context
of substantive consolidation, see Amera & Kolod, supra note 155, at 39– 43.
170. E.g., Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary,
Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 266 (2003); Tucker, supra note
15, at 437– 45.
171. See In re Lisanti Foods Inc., 241 F. App’x 1, 2 (3d Cir. 2007).
172. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). But see Baird,
supra note 159, at 15–16 (2005) (suggesting that substantive consolidation is a
matter of interstitial federal common law permissible under Erie).
173. Baird, supra note 159, at 21.
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the state substantive consolidation law meets the Butner test,
which identifies the law as creating a property interest,174 the
court would not have to rely on its general equitable powers
under § 105(a) of the Code.175 Instead, the court would exercise
a specific statutory grant of authority under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)
to hear state law claims related to a case under Title 11.176 A
bankruptcy court could hear the case, but a district court would
render final judgment, unless the parties agreed otherwise.177
Enforcing a state law claim through federal code under a distinct grant of jurisdiction is not the sort of nontraditional
equitable remedy that raises eyebrows under Grupo Mexicano.178 It stands alongside every other action explicitly authorized in the Code by Congress under authority of the Bankruptcy Clause, and every other exercise of a bankruptcy court’s 28
U.S.C. § 157 jurisdiction. Use of a state substantive consolidation action also avoids the Erie doctrine as long as the Butner
test is satisfied.179 No federal common law, interstitial or otherwise, is applied when state law provides the rule of decision
for substantive consolidation, so the issue is not raised.180
The federal bankruptcy doctrine of substantive consolidation frustrates the objectives of state corporate law by failing to
respect entity distinctions that would be upheld by the state,
resulting in inconsistent and inequitable administration of the
law between state and federal courts. Worse, bankruptcy courts
may lack jurisdiction to administer substantive consolidation,
but regularly do so anyway. States have latitude under both
the Constitution and the Bankruptcy Code to enact their own
actions for substantive consolidation, which can be enforced
consistently in state, federal, and bankruptcy courts. Use of a
174. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
175. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
176. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c); see also Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90,
96–97 (5th Cir. 1987) (explaining the differences between ―arising under,‖
―arising in,‖ and ―related to‖ jurisdiction under § 157).
177. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c); see also Susan Block-Lieb, The Case Against Supplemental Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A Constitutional, Statutory, and Policy
Analysis, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 809–10 (1994) (discussing the bounds of
§ 157(c) jurisdiction).
178. Cf. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.,
527 U.S. 308, 322 (1999) (noting the authority of Congress to design new remedies).
179. Cf. Thomas E. Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 633, 649–52 (2004) (suggesting that Erie will sometimes require
the application of state law even where some federal interest exists).
180. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).

2011]

FEDERALISM IN BANKRUPTCY

735

state action instead of a federal equitable remedy avoids the jurisdictional trap of Grupo Mexicano, allowing a theoretically
sound doctrine to develop in and be perfected by the states.
III. SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION SHOULD BE
LIMITED TO THE PROVISIONS OF STATE LAW
The interests of shareholders and creditors would be best
served if the federal bankruptcy remedy of substantive consolidation were abrogated and replaced by state law actions for
substantive consolidation. States should adopt statutes that
create a property or equitable interest in related-party assets
triggered by the insolvency of one or more entities. Any of several possible variants could avoid inconsistent application of
the law within a jurisdiction, reduce uncertainty in default and
bankruptcy, and maintain the discretion of states to define
their corporate law policies. However, to take the place of federal substantive consolidation in a bankruptcy court, a state
law must meet several criteria. It must be narrowly tailored to
avoid raising preemption concerns under the Bankruptcy
Clause. As such, it cannot go beyond establishing a claim or
property interest by discharging an entity’s debts, establishing
procedural rules, or conflicting with the Bankruptcy Code in
any way.181
A variety of substantive consolidation provisions are possible within these bounds. Attention to the details of substantive
consolidation law is important, since small differences can have
large impacts on payouts because of their effects on lien priority, structural subordination, and claim dilution.182 States may
choose to establish claims that actually force debtor entities to
merge, or they may grant a property interest in the assets of a
related debtor entity. The latter would result in something like
deemed consolidation or an extension of enterprise liability.
Claims may be held by either debtors or creditors, and held
with respect to any number of related corporations. Claims
owned by the primary debtor come closest to replicating the
flexibility and efficiency of federal substantive consolidation.
They would be property of the bankruptcy estate, under immediate control of the trustee or debtor-in-possession, but ulti181. See generally Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979) (setting limits on use of state law in bankruptcies).
182. Cf., e.g., Tucker, supra note 50, at 163–69 (discussing the interaction
between structural subordination and substantive consolidation in federal
bankruptcy courts).
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mately under direction of the creditors’ committees. This arrangement preserves flexibility in deciding whether to exercise
the debtor’s substantive consolidation rights by making the decision subject to the trustee’s fiduciary duty to maximize the estate’s value, or to a collective decision of the largest creditors.
Claims owned by creditors would have two disadvantages.
First, they would rank as the most junior unsecured creditor.
Second, it would often be advantageous for some minority of
creditors to consolidate entities; leaving the decision to individual creditors ensures the issue will have to be disputed when
consolidation is not in the best interest of a majority.
The legal standards that trigger liability for substantive or
deemed consolidation are critical to an effective policy. States
should borrow from the precedent of federal circuit courts to
formulate their basic standards.183 Drafters must delineate
what credit events allow a claim to lie. Specifying bankruptcy
per se as the trigger risks federal preemption by implementing
regulations that complement or are auxiliary to the Bankruptcy
Code.184 To be safe, states should specify that default and insolvency of two or more related entities give rise to a claim for
consolidation. States must also decide what degree of relation
must exist between related entities to subject them to consolidation rules.
Reducing the risk creditors face with regard to federal
courts’ inconsistent application of substantive consolidation is
one of the primary objectives of this proposal. Having blackletter law available and ensuring consistency between state
and federal courts reduces uncertainty.185 Rather than making
consolidation provisions mandatory, states could choose to preserve for businesses the right to contract around them or to
modify their rights in the articles of incorporation or bylaws of
subsidiaries. The advantage of establishing robust contractual
rights related to substantive consolidation is that they allow

183. For example, states could use the District of Columbia Circuit rule exemplified by Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Corp. (In re Auto-Train Corp.), 810 F.2d
270, 276–77 (D.C. Cir. 1987), or the Second Circuit rule of In re Augie/Restivo
Baking Co.), 860 F.2d 515, 518–19 (2d Cir. 1988).
184. Cf. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929) (discussing Congress’s intent to preempt state bankruptcy law with the Bankruptcy Act).
185. See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 16, at 16 (asserting that adjudicating
bankruptcy in equity ―has been particularly problematic‖ because it fails to
―provide clear ex ante rules that will result in uniform decisions‖).
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sophisticated creditors to reach a bargain in advance to minimize and efficiently allocate legal and operational risk.186
Substantive consolidation is not likely to be implemented
by every state, and is sure to be somewhat inconsistent among
those that do adopt it, at least initially. The doctrine of substantive consolidation is still in its infancy, and competition
and experimentation among the states is the best way to work
toward its optimal form.187 As states gain experience in this
form of regulation, their methods will tend to converge toward
the most effective solutions, perhaps even culminating in a uniform code. To the extent variation remains, businesses will retain their ability to choose the state with regulations most appropriate for their corporate structures.188
CONCLUSION
Substantive consolidation is an important component of
the machinery of bankruptcy. It serves as a release valve in
cases where the presence of multiple debtors in the same enterprise makes it impracticable to determine the true obligations of the debtors to each other and their creditors. As long
the merger and acquisition mill persists in assembling increasingly complex collections of legal entities, the demand for
substantive consolidation will continue to grow. But the more
popular substantive consolidation becomes, the more today’s
drawbacks will become apparent. Important creditors will push
for bankruptcy, or work less hard to avoid it, to get this lucrative remedy unavailable in state court. Moreover, the mechanism is vulnerable to jurisdictional attack on federal substantive consolidation.
A state action for substantive consolidation should be
created to fill the gap. Merely defining a property interest, it is
neither preempted by federal law, nor does it suffer the same
jurisdictional defect as the federal version. The state action
achieves uniformity of law in the state by providing the same
standard in both state and federal courts. In competition for in186. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 90, at 205–06 (―Contract, not mandatory,
rules can most effectively provide any conceivable benefit that bankruptcy
reallocation now provides.‖).
187. Cf. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW,
48–51 (1993) (explaining the advantages of state corporate regulation in the
areas of fiduciary duty and takeover statutes).
188. For a discussion of the welfare-enhancing effects of state competition
in corporate law, see Romano, supra note 106, at 214 – 45.
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corporation fee revenues, states will hone their substantive
consolidation laws to maximize shareholder value. Federalism
could rescue one of the most staunchly federal laws around.

